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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
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• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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ABSTRACT.
e security functions of regional organizations have been greatly enhanced in the 
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Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), are examined from a comparative standpoint. It is amply 
demonstrated that the eorts of regional countries to pacify the conict ridden Horn 
of Africa region through IGAD continue to be frustrated by long-standing practices of 
mutual intervention, shifting alliances, and an inability to develop shared norms 
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organizations in the developing world, ASEAN has a better track record in the 
maintenance of regional security in South East Asia. e key to the success of ASEAN 
in regional security governance lies in its development of norms proscribing mutual 
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the ird World.
Keywords: regional security governance; Horn of Africa; IGAD; South East Asia; 
ASEAN; governance norms
LSE GLOBAL SOUTH UNIT
WORKING PAPER SERIES
Global South Unit
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street. London WC2A 2AE. United Kingdom 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 7446. Email: gsu@lse.ac.uk
www.lse.ac.uk
Working Paper No. 1. 2015.
the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
INTRODUCTION.
Regional organizations play important roles in the maintenance of regional security. In the post-Cold War 
period, even regional organizations like the European Union (EU) and the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) which were initially focused on economic cooperation are assuming broader 
political and security functions. e security functions run the gamut from providing forums for condence 
building with little institutionalization all the way to collective security (Kirchner and Dominguez 2011: 
63). As examples, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its oshoot the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) are organizations that seek to promote security for their members through 
condence building, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a collective security 
arrangement with a formal institutional setup and rules of decision-making (Ibid.:10-11). 
e security functions of regional organizations are determined by a number of interrelated factors, 
including the domestic political, social and economic milieu of the member states; institutional setup and 
norms; geopolitical inuences, and the enabling or disabling environment which the international system 
and extra-regional players bring to bear on them. 
In this paper, we examine from a comparative standpoint the security functions of two regional 
organizations, namely Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and ASEAN. Such a study 
not only furnishes a better understanding of both organizations, but also provides insights that will 
contribute to academic and policy debates. 
Are IGAD and ASEAN – and by extension the Horn of Africa and Southeast Asia, respectively – 
comparable? e two regions of course have both similarities and dierences. eir similarities include state 
fragility, problems of democratic governance, and challenges in the management of ethno-linguistic and 
religious diversity. But there are also marked dierences between the two regions in terms of socio-economic 
development and regional security governance. Southeast Asia during the 1960s was described as the 
‘Balkans of the East’ or a ‘region of dominoes’ (Acharya 2001:4). But the countries of the region not only 
managed to avoid war between themselves, they were also able to attain regional security through ASEAN.  
e maintenance of security in the region greatly contributed to its socio-economic development. In 
contrast, several countries of the Horn of Africa are still locked into direct and proxy warfare. 
While many regional organizations in the developing world have failed to eectively carry out their missions, 
ASEAN’s contribution to regional security has been widely recognized. Some observers have even gone so far 
as to conceptualize the organization as a ‘nascent security community’ – one, that is, which eschews recourse 
to war to resolve conicts (Acharya 2001). ASEAN’s successes in security governance could be explained by 
the development of shared, socio-culturally rooted norms based on consultation, consensus building and 
quiet diplomacy, and adherence to international norms like non-interference and non-intervention (Acharya 
2001). In contrast, the Horn of Africa remains as a region where states continue to interfere in each other’s 
aairs. e region has not so far developed shared norms of conict management. e multitude of 
international norms that have been adopted by the African Union (AU), which in theory are applicable 
to the member states of IGAD, remain by and large ignored. But, in the importation of liberal 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
1.  As the concept ‘governance’ is broader than that of ‘government’ and considers the role of non-state actors, the concept of 
security governance is a broad one. It considers regional security as an arena in which dierent actors both national and 
international compete, conict and/or coalesce (Kirchner and Dominguez 2011: 10-11). e concept helps us ‘understand 
interactions between states and regional institutions and how they individually and/or collectively manage not only international 
and regional crises but also a variety of threats posed to national and regional security’ (Kirchner and Dominguez 2011).
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
2. Eritrea has suspended its membership in 2007 over dierences that emerged over Somalia, and thus is not presently an active 
member of the organization.
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
REFERENCES.
 
Acharya, Amitav. 2001. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order. New 
York, London: Routledge.
_____________. 2013. ‘ASEAN 2030: Challenges of Building a Mature Political and Security Community.’ Tokyo: Asian 
Development Bank.
Alden, Chris. 2010. ‘ “A pariah in our midst”: Regional Organizations and the problematic of Western-designated pariah 
regimes: e cases of SADC/Zimbabwe and ASEAN/Myanmar.’ London: LSE, State Crisis Research Centre. 
Aljazeera. 2009. ‘Africa bloc urges Eritrea sanctions: East African nations accuse Eritrea of funding and training Somali ghters’ 
Available at: [http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2009/05/200952172646855653.html]. Access date: 04.06.2104.
Anwar, Dewi Fortuna. 1994. Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign policy and regionalism. New York,  Singapore: St. Martin's Press, 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Arase, David. 2010. ‘Non-Traditional Security in China-ASEAN Cooperation: e Institutionalization of Regional Security 
Cooperation and the Evolution of East Asian Regionalism.’ Asian Survey 50/4.
AU, African Union. 2010. ‘African Peace and Security Architecture: A 2010 Assessment’ Addis Ababa: African Union 
Commission.
AU, African Union 2000. Constitutive act of the African Union. Addis Ababa: OAU.
Ayutthaya, Kusuma Sanitwong Na, W Scott ompson, and omson Gale. 2005. ‘Ethnic conicts in Southeast Asia’. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Bellamy, Alex J. 2004. Security communities and their neighbours: Regional fortresses or global integrators? Basingstoke; New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Berouk, Mesn. 2011. ‘e Horn of Africa security complex.’ in Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa, edited 
by R. Sharamo and B. Mesn. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. 1995. An agenda for peace. New York: United Nations.
Buzan, Barry. 1991. People, states, and fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era, second 
edition. Boulder, Co: L. Rienner.
Clie, Lionel. 1999. ‘Regional Dimensions of Conict in the Horn of Africa.’ ird World Quarterly 20/1.
Collins, Alan. 2007. ‘Forming a security community: Lessons from ASEAN.’ International Relations of the Asia-Pacic 7/2.
__________. 2013. Building a people-oriented security community the ASEAN way.  New York: Routledge.
Daily Nation. 2014. ‘Ethiopia’s Premier urges Museveni to pull troops out of South Sudan.’ Nairobi, February 11, 2014. 
Available at: [http://digitaledition.nationmedia.com/?iid=87375&startpage=page0000025#folio=1]. Access date: 30.05.2014
Deutsch, Karl. 1975. ‘Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.’ in Readings on the eory and Practice of European 
Integration, edited by B. F. Nelsen and Alexander Stubb. Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Dosch, Jörn. 2013. ‘e ASEAN Economic Community: e Status of Implementation, Challenges and Bottlenecks.’ Kuala 
Lumpur: CIMB ASEAN Research Institute (CARI).
Egberink, Fenna and Frans-Paul van der Putten. 2010. ‘Introduction: What is ASEAN's Relevance for Geopolitical Strategy in 
Asia?’ Journal of Current Southeast Asian Aairs 3.
El-Aendi, Abdelwahab. 2001. ‘e Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process for Sudan: e Limits of Regional Peacemaking?’ 
African Aairs, 100/401.
Emmerson, Donald K. 2005. ‘Security, Community, and Democracy in Southeast Asia: Analyzing ASEAN.’ Japanese Journal of 
Political Science 6/2.
Francis, David J. 2006. Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems  Aldershot, Burlington, VT:  Ashgate.
Haacke, Jürgen. 2003. ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture: Origins, development and prospects. London: 
RoutledgeCurzon.
Haacke, Jürgen and Paul D. Williams. 2009. ‘Regional Arrangements and Security Challenges: London: LSE, Crisis States 
Research Centre.
Healy, Sally. 2011. ‘Seeking peace and security in the Horn of Africa: the contribution of the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development.’ International Aairs 87/1.
Herbst, Jerey. 1998. ‘African Armies and Regional Peacekeeping: Are there African Solutions to African Problems?’ In War and 
peace in Southern Africa:Crime, drugs, armies, and trade, edited by R. I. Rotberg and G. Mills. Washington, D.C.; Cambridge, 
Mass: Brookings Institution Press; World Peace Foundation.
Hughes, Christopher R. 2010. ‘China’s membership of the ARF and the emergence of an East Asian diplomatic security 
culture.’ In Cooperative security in the Asia-Pacic: the ASEAN regional forum, edited by J. Haacke and N. M. Morada. 
London; New York: Routledge.
IGAD, Intergovernmental Authority on Development. 1996. ‘IGAD Agreement’.
________, 2010. ‘IGAD Partners Forum (IPF).’ Availabe at: 
[http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93&Itemid=124&limitstart=5.] Access date: 20.05.2014.
Jetschke, Anja. 2013. ‘Regional integration support by the EU in Asia: Aims and prospects.’ In e Palgrave handbook of 
EU-Asia relations, edited by T. Christiansen, E. J. Kirchner, and P. Murray. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Jones, Lee. 2012. ASEAN, sovereignty and intervention in Southeast Asia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kacowicz, Arie Marcelo. 1998. Zones of peace in the ird World : South America and West Africa in comparative perspective. 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Keohane, Robert O. 1999. ‘e demand for international regimes.’ In eory and structure in international political economy: 
an international organization reader, edited by C. Lipson and B. J. Cohen. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Khong, Yuen Fong and Helen E.S. Nesadurai. 2007. ‘Hanging together, institutional design, and cooperation in Southeast Asia: 
AFTA and the ARF.’ In Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective, edited by A. 
Acharya and A. I. Johnston. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Khoo, Nicolas. 2004. ‘Deconstructing the ASEAN Security Community: a review essay’ International Relations of the 
Asia-Pacic 4.
Kirchner, Emil Joseph and Roberto Dominguez. 2011. ‘Regional Organizations and security governance.’ In e security 
governance of regional organizations, edited by E. J. Kirchner and R. Dominguez. London; New York: Routledge.
Kurlantzick, Joshua. 2012. ‘ASEAN’s Future and Asian Integration.’ Council on Foreign Relations, New York.
Lewis, I M. 2002. A modern history of the Somalia: Nation and state in the Horn of Africa. Oxford; Hargeisa; Athens  James 
Currey; Btec Books; Ohio University Press.
MacFarlane, S. Neil. 2014. ‘Regional Organizations and Global Security Governance.’ In International organization and global 
governance, edited by T. G. Weiss and R. Wilkinson. London;  New York: Routledge.
Martin, Jones David and Michael L. R. Smith. 2002. ‘ASEAN’s imitation community.’ Orbis, 46/1.
MoFA, Minstry of Foreign Aairs. NA. ‘Saana Forum.’  Avaialble at:
[http://www.mfa.gov.et/internationalMore.php?pg=28]. Access date: 28.05.2014.
Mulugeta, Gebrehiwot Berhe. 2014. ‘Regional Peace and Security Co-operation under the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development: Development and Challenges.’ Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review, 30/1.
Nelson, Brad. 2013. ‘Can Indonesia Lead ASEAN?’ e Diplomat. Available at: 
[http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/can-indonesia-lead-asean/?allpages=yes].Access date: 01.06.2014.
Neyer, Jürgen. 2012. e justication of Europe: A political theory of supranational integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Phan, H. D. 2012. A Selective Approach to Establishing a Human Rights Mechanism in Southeast Asia: e Case for a 
Southeast Asian Court of Human Rights. Leiden: BRILL.
Public Intelligence. 2013. ‘U.S. Drone and Surveillance Flight Bases in Africa Map and Photos.’ Available at 
[http://publicintelligence.net/us-drones-in-africa]. Access date: 25.05.2014.
Redie, Bereketeab (ed.) 2013. e Horn of Africa: Intra-state and Inter-state conicts and security. London: Pluto Press. 
Rotberg, Robert I. 2005. ‘e Horn of Africa and Yemen: Diminishing the threat of Terrorism.’ In Battling terrorism in the 
Horn of Africa, edited by R. I. Rotberg. Cambridge, Mass.; Washington, D.C.: World Peace Foundation; Brookings Institution Press.
Smith, Anthony L. 2005. ‘Terrorism in Southeast Asia.’ In Terrorism in Southeast Asia : implications for South Asia, edited by 
W. John and S. Parashar. New Delhi: Pearson Education.
Söderbaum, Fredrik and Rodrigo Tavares. 2011. ‘Problematizing Regional Organizations in African Security.’ In Regional 
organizations in African security, edited by F. Söderbaum and R. Tavares. London: Routledge.
Sukma, Rizal. 2009. ‘Democracy Building in South East Asia: e ASEAN Security Community and Options for the European 
Union.’ Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
___________. 2014. ‘ASEAN Beyond 2015: e Imperatives for Further Institutional Changes.’ Jakarta: Economic Research 
Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA).
Tekeste, Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll. 2000. Brothers at war: making sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. Oxford: James Currey. 
UNSC. 2009. ‘Resolution 1907 (2009).’ New York: UN Security Council. 
Wain, Barry. 2012. ‘Latent Danger: Boundary Disputes and Border Issues in Southeast Asia.’ In Southeast Asian aairs, edited 
by D. Singh and P. ambipillai. Singapore: ISEAS.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR.
Asnake Kefale.
Assistant Professor.
Department of Political Science and International Relations. 
Addis Ababa University, P.O. Box 1176, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
asnakekefale@gmail.com
LSE GLOBAL SOUTH UNIT
WORKING PAPER SERIES
Global South Unit
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street. London WC2A 2AE. United Kingdom 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 7446. Email: gsu@lse.ac.uk
www.lse.ac.uk
Working Paper No. 1. 2015.
8
the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
3. e AU promotes global democratic and human rights norms through several instruments, such as ‘[prohibition] of 
unconstitutional change of government in Africa; the African Charter of Elections and Democracy; the Protocol to the African 
Charter of Human Rights on the rights of women; and the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa’ (see Vines 
2013:90-91).
4. e key elements of the framework include the Peace and Security Council, the African Standby Force, Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs), the Panel of the Wise, the African Peace Fund, and the Continental Early Warning System (see AU 2010).
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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e rst major military engagement of the frontline states was in 1995. Ethiopia and 
Eritrea contributed troops and artillery, transported it through Kenya to Uganda and 
joined the Ugandan contingent and SPLA forces and attacked the Sudan Armed Forces 
(SAF). is military operation brought SPLA from a very narrow corridor in the border 
of Uganda to around 40 miles close to Juba and liberated the whole Eastern Equateria 
[sic] from SAF. e second military operation was done in 1997 by Ugandan and 
Ethiopian forces along [with] SPLA forces. Again this operation started at the border of 
Uganda and drove the forces of SAF up to a place the SPLA calls Mile 45 (a place which 
is 45 kilometres [sic] from Juba) liberating the whole Western Equateria [sic] from SAF 
forces. e same year the third and major military intervention was made by Ethiopian 
and SPLA forces in the Kumruk Gizen area and drove SAF forces for hundreds of square 
miles [and] liberated the …[whole] Southern Blue Nile and the Ingassina Hills area up 
to the vicinity of the town of Demazin. is third military operation brought the whole 
military engagement to a dierent level by opening an active front that directly 
threaten[ed] Khartoum from close vicinity. [is]… military intervention was made in 
close cooperation with the US government to which [it] provided a military assistance of 
US 20 million [dollars] where most of it was given in the form of used military 
hardware... (cited in Mulugeta 2014:118).
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
5. According to Deutsch et al., a security community emerges when a group of people (states) integrate to form a community 
through well-established, internalized and widely spread institutions and practices that ensure peaceful change among its members 
(Deutsch 1975). In such a community, ‘there is a real assurance that the members of the community will not attack each other 
physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way’ (Deutsch 1975:124).
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
LSE GLOBAL SOUTH UNIT
WORKING PAPER SERIES
Global South Unit
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street. London WC2A 2AE. United Kingdom 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 7446. Email: gsu@lse.ac.uk
www.lse.ac.uk
Working Paper No. 1. 2015.
16
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
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Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
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Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
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Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
REFERENCES.
 
Acharya, Amitav. 2001. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order. New 
York, London: Routledge.
_____________. 2013. ‘ASEAN 2030: Challenges of Building a Mature Political and Security Community.’ Tokyo: Asian 
Development Bank.
Alden, Chris. 2010. ‘ “A pariah in our midst”: Regional Organizations and the problematic of Western-designated pariah 
regimes: e cases of SADC/Zimbabwe and ASEAN/Myanmar.’ London: LSE, State Crisis Research Centre. 
Aljazeera. 2009. ‘Africa bloc urges Eritrea sanctions: East African nations accuse Eritrea of funding and training Somali ghters’ 
Available at: [http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2009/05/200952172646855653.html]. Access date: 04.06.2104.
Anwar, Dewi Fortuna. 1994. Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign policy and regionalism. New York,  Singapore: St. Martin's Press, 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Arase, David. 2010. ‘Non-Traditional Security in China-ASEAN Cooperation: e Institutionalization of Regional Security 
Cooperation and the Evolution of East Asian Regionalism.’ Asian Survey 50/4.
AU, African Union. 2010. ‘African Peace and Security Architecture: A 2010 Assessment’ Addis Ababa: African Union 
Commission.
AU, African Union 2000. Constitutive act of the African Union. Addis Ababa: OAU.
Ayutthaya, Kusuma Sanitwong Na, W Scott ompson, and omson Gale. 2005. ‘Ethnic conicts in Southeast Asia’. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Bellamy, Alex J. 2004. Security communities and their neighbours: Regional fortresses or global integrators? Basingstoke; New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Berouk, Mesn. 2011. ‘e Horn of Africa security complex.’ in Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa, edited 
by R. Sharamo and B. Mesn. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. 1995. An agenda for peace. New York: United Nations.
Buzan, Barry. 1991. People, states, and fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era, second 
edition. Boulder, Co: L. Rienner.
Clie, Lionel. 1999. ‘Regional Dimensions of Conict in the Horn of Africa.’ ird World Quarterly 20/1.
Collins, Alan. 2007. ‘Forming a security community: Lessons from ASEAN.’ International Relations of the Asia-Pacic 7/2.
__________. 2013. Building a people-oriented security community the ASEAN way.  New York: Routledge.
Daily Nation. 2014. ‘Ethiopia’s Premier urges Museveni to pull troops out of South Sudan.’ Nairobi, February 11, 2014. 
Available at: [http://digitaledition.nationmedia.com/?iid=87375&startpage=page0000025#folio=1]. Access date: 30.05.2014
Deutsch, Karl. 1975. ‘Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.’ in Readings on the eory and Practice of European 
Integration, edited by B. F. Nelsen and Alexander Stubb. Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Dosch, Jörn. 2013. ‘e ASEAN Economic Community: e Status of Implementation, Challenges and Bottlenecks.’ Kuala 
Lumpur: CIMB ASEAN Research Institute (CARI).
Egberink, Fenna and Frans-Paul van der Putten. 2010. ‘Introduction: What is ASEAN's Relevance for Geopolitical Strategy in 
Asia?’ Journal of Current Southeast Asian Aairs 3.
El-Aendi, Abdelwahab. 2001. ‘e Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process for Sudan: e Limits of Regional Peacemaking?’ 
African Aairs, 100/401.
Emmerson, Donald K. 2005. ‘Security, Community, and Democracy in Southeast Asia: Analyzing ASEAN.’ Japanese Journal of 
Political Science 6/2.
Francis, David J. 2006. Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems  Aldershot, Burlington, VT:  Ashgate.
Haacke, Jürgen. 2003. ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture: Origins, development and prospects. London: 
RoutledgeCurzon.
Haacke, Jürgen and Paul D. Williams. 2009. ‘Regional Arrangements and Security Challenges: London: LSE, Crisis States 
Research Centre.
Healy, Sally. 2011. ‘Seeking peace and security in the Horn of Africa: the contribution of the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development.’ International Aairs 87/1.
Herbst, Jerey. 1998. ‘African Armies and Regional Peacekeeping: Are there African Solutions to African Problems?’ In War and 
peace in Southern Africa:Crime, drugs, armies, and trade, edited by R. I. Rotberg and G. Mills. Washington, D.C.; Cambridge, 
Mass: Brookings Institution Press; World Peace Foundation.
Hughes, Christopher R. 2010. ‘China’s membership of the ARF and the emergence of an East Asian diplomatic security 
culture.’ In Cooperative security in the Asia-Pacic: the ASEAN regional forum, edited by J. Haacke and N. M. Morada. 
London; New York: Routledge.
IGAD, Intergovernmental Authority on Development. 1996. ‘IGAD Agreement’.
________, 2010. ‘IGAD Partners Forum (IPF).’ Availabe at: 
[http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93&Itemid=124&limitstart=5.] Access date: 20.05.2014.
Jetschke, Anja. 2013. ‘Regional integration support by the EU in Asia: Aims and prospects.’ In e Palgrave handbook of 
EU-Asia relations, edited by T. Christiansen, E. J. Kirchner, and P. Murray. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Jones, Lee. 2012. ASEAN, sovereignty and intervention in Southeast Asia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kacowicz, Arie Marcelo. 1998. Zones of peace in the ird World : South America and West Africa in comparative perspective. 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Keohane, Robert O. 1999. ‘e demand for international regimes.’ In eory and structure in international political economy: 
an international organization reader, edited by C. Lipson and B. J. Cohen. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Khong, Yuen Fong and Helen E.S. Nesadurai. 2007. ‘Hanging together, institutional design, and cooperation in Southeast Asia: 
AFTA and the ARF.’ In Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective, edited by A. 
Acharya and A. I. Johnston. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Khoo, Nicolas. 2004. ‘Deconstructing the ASEAN Security Community: a review essay’ International Relations of the 
Asia-Pacic 4.
Kirchner, Emil Joseph and Roberto Dominguez. 2011. ‘Regional Organizations and security governance.’ In e security 
governance of regional organizations, edited by E. J. Kirchner and R. Dominguez. London; New York: Routledge.
Kurlantzick, Joshua. 2012. ‘ASEAN’s Future and Asian Integration.’ Council on Foreign Relations, New York.
Lewis, I M. 2002. A modern history of the Somalia: Nation and state in the Horn of Africa. Oxford; Hargeisa; Athens  James 
Currey; Btec Books; Ohio University Press.
MacFarlane, S. Neil. 2014. ‘Regional Organizations and Global Security Governance.’ In International organization and global 
governance, edited by T. G. Weiss and R. Wilkinson. London;  New York: Routledge.
Martin, Jones David and Michael L. R. Smith. 2002. ‘ASEAN’s imitation community.’ Orbis, 46/1.
MoFA, Minstry of Foreign Aairs. NA. ‘Saana Forum.’  Avaialble at:
[http://www.mfa.gov.et/internationalMore.php?pg=28]. Access date: 28.05.2014.
Mulugeta, Gebrehiwot Berhe. 2014. ‘Regional Peace and Security Co-operation under the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development: Development and Challenges.’ Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review, 30/1.
Nelson, Brad. 2013. ‘Can Indonesia Lead ASEAN?’ e Diplomat. Available at: 
[http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/can-indonesia-lead-asean/?allpages=yes].Access date: 01.06.2014.
Neyer, Jürgen. 2012. e justication of Europe: A political theory of supranational integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Phan, H. D. 2012. A Selective Approach to Establishing a Human Rights Mechanism in Southeast Asia: e Case for a 
Southeast Asian Court of Human Rights. Leiden: BRILL.
Public Intelligence. 2013. ‘U.S. Drone and Surveillance Flight Bases in Africa Map and Photos.’ Available at 
[http://publicintelligence.net/us-drones-in-africa]. Access date: 25.05.2014.
Redie, Bereketeab (ed.) 2013. e Horn of Africa: Intra-state and Inter-state conicts and security. London: Pluto Press. 
Rotberg, Robert I. 2005. ‘e Horn of Africa and Yemen: Diminishing the threat of Terrorism.’ In Battling terrorism in the 
Horn of Africa, edited by R. I. Rotberg. Cambridge, Mass.; Washington, D.C.: World Peace Foundation; Brookings Institution Press.
Smith, Anthony L. 2005. ‘Terrorism in Southeast Asia.’ In Terrorism in Southeast Asia : implications for South Asia, edited by 
W. John and S. Parashar. New Delhi: Pearson Education.
Söderbaum, Fredrik and Rodrigo Tavares. 2011. ‘Problematizing Regional Organizations in African Security.’ In Regional 
organizations in African security, edited by F. Söderbaum and R. Tavares. London: Routledge.
Sukma, Rizal. 2009. ‘Democracy Building in South East Asia: e ASEAN Security Community and Options for the European 
Union.’ Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
___________. 2014. ‘ASEAN Beyond 2015: e Imperatives for Further Institutional Changes.’ Jakarta: Economic Research 
Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA).
Tekeste, Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll. 2000. Brothers at war: making sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. Oxford: James Currey. 
UNSC. 2009. ‘Resolution 1907 (2009).’ New York: UN Security Council. 
Wain, Barry. 2012. ‘Latent Danger: Boundary Disputes and Border Issues in Southeast Asia.’ In Southeast Asian aairs, edited 
by D. Singh and P. ambipillai. Singapore: ISEAS.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR.
Asnake Kefale.
Assistant Professor.
Department of Political Science and International Relations. 
Addis Ababa University, P.O. Box 1176, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
asnakekefale@gmail.com
the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
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Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
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e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
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e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
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e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
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e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
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e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
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e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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ensure that the peoples and member states of ASEAN live in peace with one another and 
with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment. (ASEAN 
Secretariat, cited in Collins 2013:2)
e member states of ASEAN are trying to achieve far-reaching visions of economic 
community-building, which are not that much dissimilar to European integration, 
without the necessary modications to the traditional ASEAN Way of cooperation. (2013:8)
the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
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e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
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e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
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e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
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e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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the renewed IGAD are broad and range from economic cooperation to the prevention and 
management of intra- and inter-state conicts (IGAD 1996). e reinvention of IGAD as a general 
purpose regional organization resulted from an optimism that emerged in the region at the 
beginning of the 1990s. is period saw the ending of Eritrea’s three-decade-long secessionist war 
and the collapse of the military regime in Ethiopia. e two movements which emerged to govern 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, namely the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively, had 
been strong allies in the armed struggle against the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime. After coming to 
power, both governments began to play an assertive role in regional politics. e reinvention of 
IGAD was partly a result of the concordance that emerged between these two regimes and their 
friendly relations with the Sudanese government of Osman Al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 
(El-Aendi 2001: 597). 
But the triangular concord between Addis Ababa, Asmara and Khartoum was to be a short-lived 
one. As will be discussed in section 5 below, relations between the three countries deteriorated, 
which severely handicapped IGAD’s ability to carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as many of the 
member states have a long history of rivalry and little history of regional cooperation, IGAD had a 
shaky foundation. at is why El-Aendi has characterized the organization as a club of ‘reluctant 
collaborators’ (El-Aendi 2001: 597).
e other factor challenging IGAD’s competence is potentially conicting memberships by several 
member states in other regional organizations. Of the eight current members, Kenya, Uganda and 
South Sudan are members of another regional organization, the East African Community (EAC), 
while Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti are also members of the Arab League. As a result, IGAD 
members have competing centres of attention for their regionalism. Interestingly, it is only Ethiopia 
and Eritrea who are not members of other regional groups. No wonder, then, that they decided to 
take the leading role in the reinvention of IGAD in 1996. Conversely, the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries since their 1998-2000 war has signicantly debilitated the organization. 
In spite of its profound weakness and inability to forge unity of purpose among its members, IGAD 
has emerged as the key security governance institution in the Horn of Africa. It sponsored the 2005 
Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war in South Sudan. And it was 
IGAD that led the reconciliation process leading to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in 2004. 
Like the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia’s security situation was bleak prior to the formation of the 
ASEAN. A stew of domestic, regional and international threats made the region extremely insecure. 
e post-colonial governments of the region were fragile and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race and 
religion. As might be expected, their foremost aim immediately after independence was state 
consolidation. Many countries of the region were also threatened by subversive communist 
movements (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). Moreover, there were (and still are) 
territorial and border disputes between them. Indonesia, the largest country in the region, in the 
wake of independence followed a policy called Konfrontasi (confrontation). It vehemently opposed 
Malaysia, which it considered a British imperial project (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 
2007). After President Sukarno was removed from oce in 1966, the new leadership under General 
Suharto desisted from Konfrontasi, opening the door for regional cooperation and the establishment 
of ASEAN. 
e region was also entangled in the confrontations of the Cold War, as extra-regional powers – the 
US, the former USSR, and China – involved themselves in the conicts then raging in the three 
Indo-Chinese countries of the region, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ere was also a fear that the 
communist states (Vietnam and Cambodia) would export their ideology to the other ASEAN 
countries (Acharya 2001; Khong and Nesadurai 2007). 
e six founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
ailand, established the organization in August 1967 in Bangkok. At that time there was little hope 
that the new organization could help bring the much-needed stability to the region (Acharya 
2001:5). By the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was considered one of the most successful regional 
organizations in the ird World in terms of regional security. e organization has succeeded in 
moderating intra-regional conicts and tensions: ASEAN members have never gone to war against 
each other (Acharya 2001). 
After the Cold War ended, ASEAN realised its dream of uniting Southeast Asia by admitting 
Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1998), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997). Today ASEAN has ten 
member states. ASEAN bears important security and economic signicance for the Asia-Pacic 
region; in particular, it plays an important role in the ‘triangular relationships between China, Japan 
and the United States’ (Egberink and Putten 2010:93). e steady expansion of the organization has 
brought its own challenges and opportunities. Yet the global diusion of universalistic norms of 
human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War period threatens ASEAN’s cherished norms of 
non-interference/-intervention, as will be discussed below. 
SOURCES OF INSECURITY. 
Of all the regions of the world, the Horn of Africa is one of those most ridden by conicts of both 
an intra-state and inter-state character; indeed, the region’s intra- and inter-state conicts are 
intimately interconnected. In some cases, an intra-state conict has spilled across international 
boundaries to trigger an inter-state conict (Clie 1999; Redie 2013). e region is also threatened 
by transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Shabab. 
In sum, the roles that regional organizations might play in security governance span the gamut from 
multipliers and conduits of global agendas regarding governance, human rights, democracy, peace 
and security; to instruments of that provide legitimacy for intra-regional and extra-regional action; 
to instruments of regional resistance to pressures coming from western powers (see Alden 2010). e 
records of IGAD and ASEAN may be seen from the above three perspectives, as will be discussed in 
section 6 below.
BRIEF BACKGROUND. 
e precursor to the current IGAD was established in 1986. e six countries that formed the 
organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertication (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In 
addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, 
respectively. IGADD was established at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating 
drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. At present, IGAD brings together the eight 
countries of the Horn of Africa.2 is region has enormous geopolitical signicance (Mulugeta 
2014). It could be considered a bridge connecting three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
Because of the sea lanes that connect the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, there has been historically an intense geopolitical interest in the 
region by international powers.
 
At the time of its establishment IGADD was supposed to be a non-political, functional 
organization. e tense security situation that prevailed in the region made it unthinkable to endow 
the new organization with security responsibilities. During this period, civil wars were raging in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda; moreover, the region was gripped by Cold War 
confrontations by proxy between the former USSR and the USA. IGADD’s main aim was thus to 
coordinate the eorts of the member states and international donors in addressing environmental 
problems, namely drought and desertication (Healy 2011: 107). In spite of the limited function 
bestowed on IGADD from its very inception, it somehow attained a high prole. Its inauguration 
was attended by the heads of states of the founding members. In fact, it was at the 1986 IGADD 
summit that the bitter foes Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohammed Siad Barre of 
Somalia, who had fought the 1977-78 Ogaden war, met for the rst time. ey subsequently agreed 
to de-escalate tensions on their borders by signing a truce in April 1988 (Healy 2011).
In 1995 the IGADD member states decided to broaden the mandate of the organization. At the 
Nairobi summit in 1996 it was brought to its present form and renamed IGAD. e mandates of 
norms with little chance of enforcement, the ASEAN of today and IGAD/AU are showing 
paradoxical similarities, as will be suciently explained by the last section of this paper.
e paper is divided into eight parts. e rst section provides a short introduction to the paper. e 
second section briey discusses the security functions of regional organizations. Section three 
introduces IGAD and ASEAN by briey narrating their histories. e fourth section assesses some 
of the main sources of insecurity in the two regions. Section ve examines the pathways by which 
security governance institutions and norms evolved in the two regions. Section six describes the 
institutional setup of IGAD and ASEAN. e seventh section deals with questions of regional 
hegemony and leadership. e nal section examines the challenges and the future prospects of the 
two organizations, and provides a comparative assessment of the insights that may be derived from 
this study. 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE. 
Regional organizations have become increasingly common as security governance structures in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane 2014: 432). Regional security during the Cold War was by and 
large governed by the balance-of-power and spheres-of-inuence practices of the two superpowers. 
us, during the Cold War regional organizations were rarely engaged in peace operations 
(MacFarlane 2014). In many regions of the world, the end of the Cold War precipitated bloody 
conicts, viz. Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia. e unprecedented growth of intra-state conicts, 
which in some cases become regionalized by the participation of external actors, engendered an 
interest in the role that regional organizations could play in regional security governance.1
Yet a realization that regional organizations could play positive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is nothing new. e UN Charter devotes an entire chapter to 
outlining the principles and modalities of their engagement in the maintenance of international 
peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former Secretary 
General of the UN, further promoted the engagement of regional organizations in promoting peace 
and security in his 1995 Agenda for Peace. However, Boutros Ghali noted the caveat that regional 
organizations could play a positive role in the maintenance of peace and security ‘if their activities 
are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationships with the UN, and particularly the Security Council is governed by Chapter VIII’ 
(MacFarlane 2014: 429).
e enthusiasm for the security role of regional organizations in the contemporary epoch may be 
regarded from three perspectives. First, there is a desire by global actors to subcontract security tasks 
to regional actors in the name of creating regional and local ownership of peace processes 
(MacFarlane 2014). For example, it has become fashionable to talk about ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (Herbst 1998). Correspondingly, there has been a growing assertiveness from 
regional groups to assume more security functions for themselves. e African Union (AU), for 
instance, is endeavouring to develop norms and structures of security governance through the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Secondly, in face of the unprecedented proliferation of intra-state conicts, it helps immensely to 
reduce the burden of conict management on the UN and the global powers to involve regional 
organizations in security governance (MacFarlane 2014: 429). ere is a corollary belief that 
regional countries and organizations are in a better position to manage conicts than a global body 
like the UN because of shared cultural anities, personal relationships between leaders, and an 
ability to react to emergencies in a more timely way than the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 7).
irdly, regional organizations also provide an important legitimizing function for the UN and 
other international actors. For instance, the Arab League’s request for action was used to secure the 
UN Security Council’s endorsement of NATO intervention to ‘protect civilians’ in Libya 
(MacFarlane 2014: 439).
e UN position on and approach to the security functions of regional organizations is clear from 
the Charter: the peace-keeping, -making or -enforcement operations of regional organizations 
should be conducted under UN mandate. Following this view, the relationship between the UN and 
regional organizations is vertical, and the latter might be considered subsidiary to the former 
(Söderbaum and Tavares 2011: 5). Given that many ‘[regional] organizations have embraced the 
UN’s global principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (MacFarlane 2014: 435), it 
is thought that regional organizations might help build rule-based peace and security structures 
across the world. e practice, however, is far otherwise. On the one hand, regional organizations, 
which were expected to serve as conduits for liberal international norms, are actually used by their 
members as instruments to resist intervention by global (viz. Western) powers (Alden 2010). On the 
other hand, contradicting the idea that regional organizations should serve under UN mandate, 
some of them, notably NATO, intervene in conict situations without any such approval. e AU 
Constitutive Act, which may be considered the foundation for APSA, is largely in tune with 
multilateralism and the UN Charter, except that it reserves to itself a right to intervene in its member 
states, apparently without rst seeking approval from the UN Security Council (Söderbaum and 
Tavares 2011: 6). 
With the latest (2014) coup in ailand, the tally of ASEAN countries on the democratic path can 
be reduced to just two – the Philippines and Indonesia. It is even dicult to say that these two 
countries have established robust democratic institutions or civil societies, which could withstand 
political upheavals and reversions to authoritarian rule. is means that essentially all the countries 
of the region are still vulnerable to political destabilization.
  
In addition to problems of democratic consolidation, many countries of the region face ethnic and 
nationalist conicts. A number of separatist movements operate in areas such as southern 
Philippines and southern ailand. Several countries also face armed ethnic rebellions, like 
Myanmar (see Ayutthaya et al. 2005). ese intra-state conicts could spill over to threaten regional 
security. ere is also the insecurity posed by terrorist movements like the Al-Qaeda aliate Jemmah 
Islamiyah (Smith 2005).
  
ASEAN is confronted by many territorial disputes, the majority of which have been frozen (Wain 
2012). e fact that these disputes have been contained and the countries of the region have 
managed to maintain cooperation has been cited as one of ASEAN’s signal successes (Acharya 
2001:132). But other scholars point to the recent are-up of violence between Cambodia and 
ailand along their disputed borderline – the ancient Preah Vihear temple –as a wake-up call (Wain 
2012:38). It is, however, necessary to underline that, unlike the situation in the Horn of Africa, the 
conict between Cambodia and ailand has not escalated into a full-scale war.
In recent years there has been an escalation of territorial disputes between a resurgent China, on the 
one hand, and some ASEAN members as well as Japan, on the other. is poses a serious threat to 
regional stability. ASEAN’s attempt at ‘socializing China’ (Hughes 2010) and maintaining a broader 
Asia-Pacic regional security through ARF appears to have encountered serious diculties. Recently, 
tensions have increased between China and Vietnam in particular. While ASEAN may continue to 
engage China within the ARF framework, the US appears to have assumed the broader task of 
guaranteeing security, or more precisely of counterbalancing China, in the Asia Pacic region. In this 
respect, the US has decided to re-deploy its troops to the Philippines.
 
A TALE OF TWO REGIONS: ‘SECURITY COMPLEX’ VS. ‘NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY’. 
e security landscape and the norms of security governance are markedly dierent as between the 
IGAD and ASEAN regions. While the situation in the former could be described by Buzan’s concept 
of security complex, the latter is often viewed as a ‘nascent security community’ in which shared 
norms and interests have resulted by and large in the avoidance of inter-state wars (Acharya 
2001:19). e two regions also exhibit signicant dierences in their approaches to conict 
management. 
Looking at IGAD’s conict management role from a legal perspective, it could be considered as 
subsidiary to the rather ambitious APSA. APSA, in turn, is not only in tune with UN thinking about 
the role of regional organizations in the management of international security (Boutros-Ghali 
1995), but also imbued with liberal norms of human rights and democracy.3 e Constitutive Act 
of the AU, which came into force in 2001, includes in Article 4 a provision permitting intervention 
in member states under ‘grave circumstances’ (AU 2000:7). APSA, the conict management 
structure set up under the aegis of the AU, is a framework of formal legal agreements, institutions 
and decision-making processes which together handle the prevention, management and resolution 
of conicts on the continent (AU 2010).4 It envisages a hierarchical security governance structure 
and considers regional organizations like IGAD, which it calls Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), subsidiary organs to its framework. Accordingly, the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC), tasked with coordinating AU conict prevention and management activities, is required to 
harmonize with regional mechanisms like IGAD (Healy 2011: 106). Some of the institutions 
envisaged by APSA are not yet functional, and its conict management activities are dependent on 
donor funding (Vines 2013). 
Supplemental to the norms the AU seeks to promote on the continent, the 1996 IGAD agreement 
contains broad mandates. According to Article 18A the member states agree to: 
• Take eective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability;
• Establish an eective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacic settlement of 
dierences and disputes; and
• Accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before 
they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 1996).
e legal, rational norms promoted by AU and IGAD notwithstanding, IGAD’s conict 
management practices cannot be understood in isolation from the immemorial recourses that 
continue to be used by the region’s states to safeguard their security, which inter alia include the use 
of armed force, mutual intervention, and shifting alliances. In fact, IGAD exhibits some of the key 
features of a security complex, like (negative) security interdependence, which is a result of ‘religious, 
national and historical patterns which run across state boundaries’ (Buzan 1991:106-107). e 
security interdependence prevailing in the Horn of Africa appears to provide sound reasons for 
cooperation. But the established state practice of underpinning ‘national’ security is by undercutting 
the security of neighbouring countries. As a result, the use of force, mutual intervention, and shifting 
alliances are the most important instruments actually used by the governments of the region in the 
name of maintaining their security. is is quite a contrast with ASEAN. 
In other words, the legal commitment of IGAD member states to submit to pacic norms in settling 
conicts has not prevented recourse to violence. us, the region saw a full-scale war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. Even though the IGAD agreement, as noted above, 
stipulates that member states refer their disputes to IGAD before referring them to other regional 
and international organizations, IGAD was never involved in mediating the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict. Ethiopia also intervened unilaterally in Somalia in 2006. Eritrea, for its part, made war on 
Djibouti over contested borders. ere have been also intermittent clashes between Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan over unresolved boundary issues after the latter gained independence in 2011. 
e countries of the Horn of Africa have a damaging history of mutual intervention, that is, aiding 
each other’s enemies in order to achieve their own security objectives (Clie 1999). For example, 
starting in the 1970s Sudan and Somalia aided various Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel movements, like 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). In retaliation Ethiopia aided the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and various Somali factions. In the 1990s Uganda aided the SPLA while 
Sudan in turn aided the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
e practice of mutual intervention, howbeit intended to guarantee state security and achieve broad 
geo-political goals against a security dilemma backdrop, has been devastating to the region (Berouk 
2011). e decision in 1996 to enhance the mandate of IGAD was partly intended to move away 
from this destructive practice and build condence between member states. IGAD’s record in 
containing intervention has been abysmal, however, if not indeed null. Even today, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea continue the practice of mutual intervention: they both provide sanctuary and aid to each 
other’s opposition/insurrectionist movements. is is in stark contrast with ASEAN, where the 
non-interference norm has prevailed, and its practice has helped maintain regional security, as will 
be discussed below.  
Establishing intra-regional alliances to target a particular state in the region is another hallmark 
practice in the Horn of Africa (Berouk 2011; Healy 2011). Geopolitical factors, domestic politics, 
and the interests of the extra-regional powers determine intra-regional alliance formation as well as 
the instability of such alliances. Instrumental for the reinvention of IGAD and intra-regional 
stability was the alliance between the EPLF and the EPRDF, mentioned above, which brought down 
the former Ethiopian military regime in 1991, and the good relations that these 
movements-turned-governments had with Sudan in the early 1990s. But the alliance fractured in 
1994 when the National Islamic Front gained control of the government of Sudan and began a 
policy of exporting its Islamist ideology to neighbouring countries (see Healy 2011). At the 
instigation of the US, the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda formed a 
combined front to contain Sudan’s Islamist regime. In the mid-1990s, these allies launched targeted 
military operations against Khartoum. According to the former Chief of Sta of the Ethiopian Army:
But the alliance forged against Khartoum broke down in 1998, when the key countries in the group, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, began their destructive war. Both countries swiftly mended their relationship 
with Sudan (Healy 2011). In October 2002 another coalition with the implicit objective of 
containing Eritrea was created by countries in the region, including Yemen from across the Red Sea. 
is coalition was called the Sana’a Forum and comprised Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen, later joined 
by Somalia (2004) and Djibouti (2010). e Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aairs claims that the 
group was established to coordinate regional security cooperation and to deepen economic ties 
between the member states, not to contain Eritrea (Ethiopian MoFA no date). But judging by the 
historical trends in alliance formation in the region, the coalition was undoubtedly meant to contain 
Eritrea. A consequence of all this has been to undermine IGAD as a regional secuirty governance 
organ. But in a region where such intra-regional alliances are formed, it is impossible to talk about a 
regional security architecture based on ‘shared’ norms and institutions.
e IGAD-sponsored Somalia and Sudan peace processes were also negatively aected by traditional 
practices of mutual intervention and alliance formation. In both peace processes the mediators were 
not impartial and put their national interests rst. In the case of Somalia, the stances of key countries 
like Ethiopia and Kenya were conditioned by their national interests. Ethiopia sent troops to 
Somalia in 2006 when it felt its security or national interests threatened by the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which gained control of Mogadishu in that year. After that intervention, Eritrea began 
providing aid to Somali Islamist militias as a way of undermining its regional nemesis, Ethiopia. In 
response, IGAD under Ethiopia’s leadership recommended UN sanctioning of Eritrea (Aljazeera 
2009). Following the recommendation of IGAD and AU, the UN put sanctions on Eritrea, 
including arms embargos, travel restrictions, and asset freezes (UNSC 2009). e building of a 
coalition within the ranks of IGAD against member state Eritrea may be seen as an Ethiopian 
foreign policy success. But the entire Eritrean saga within IGAD shows the diculty of developing 
regional security architecture without resolving outstanding inter-state disputes between the 
members of the organization. 
In contrast to the secuity complex concept that bet so well the situation in the IGAD region, 
ASEAN exhibits important features of a security community. In a seminal work on the ASEAN, 
Acharya (2001) introduced the security community concept to the ASEAN discourse. e concept 
was rst introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s.5 
Acharya used Deutsch’s concept to explain what had helped ASEAN avoid war between its 
members. It is important to note that he was cautious in his application of the concept. He did not 
claim ASEAN could be considered a security community in the manner conceptualized by Deutsch. 
Deutsch’s pluralistic communities were apparently formed by liberal states (Deutsch 1975); which 
are a rarity in the ird World, including Southeast Asia. As a result, Acharya coined a carefully 
worded term – nascent pluralistic community – to capture the sense of community that was being 
created in Southeast Asia. 
e proposition that ASEAN was evolving into a security community (Bellamy 2004), or is 
emerging as a nascent pluralistic community (Acharya 2001), engendered a lively debate which will 
not be repeated here (see Emmerson 2005; Haacke 2003; Khoo 2004; Martin and Smith 2002). In 
this paper Acharya’s nascent security community is deployed to understand how ASEAN helped 
maintain regional stability where other regional organizations like IGAD failed.
According to Acharya, norms play an indispensable role in security communities. ey not only 
‘prescribe and proscribe behaviour’, but also ‘teach states [...] new interests and identities’, creating a 
life of their own (Acharya 2001:24-25). ASEAN regionalism was thus underpinned by norms that 
could be characterised as ‘legal-rational’ and ‘socio-cultural’ (Acharya 2001). Specically, ve key 
norms shaped the identity of ASEAN and its activities: (1) non-interference, (2) non-use of force, 
(3) regional autonomy, (4) avoidance of ASEAN military pact, and (5) the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya 
2001:26).  
While legal-rational norms like non-interference and non-use of force were derived from 
well-known international law principles, there were also peculiarly ASEAN socio-cultural norms 
which have been traced to the Asian-Javanese culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus 
building (mufakat) (Acharya 2001:26;68). It was these socio-cultural norms that were responsible 
for the ASEAN way of security management, which is characterized by informality, organizational 
minimalism, and consensus building (Acharya 2001:63). ese norms also include the use of quiet 
diplomacy, which consists of informal negotiations and consultations. Such negotiating practices 
help save reputation or face for parties to a conict. In some cases, the way a dispute is handled may 
be more important than the cause of the dispute itself. us, Kishore Mohbubani, a former 
Singaporean senior ocial, said, ‘Face is important and conict can break out when it is lost’ (cited 
in Haacke 2003:7). In sum, the ASEAN way made the organization distinct from Western models 
of international or regional organizations that are usually ‘treaty-based institutions, [with] formal 
voting procedures, and binding rights, rules, and obligations for members’ (Arase 2010:808).
When it comes to the legal-rational norms, ‘the single most important principle underpinning 
ASEAN regionalism has been the doctrine of non-interference in the internal aairs of member 
states’ (Acharya 2001: 57). In the context of ASEAN, non-interference consists of the following elements: 
• Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people, including 
violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and political 
styles of governments a basis for deciding membership in ASEAN. 
• Criticising the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference 
principle. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was not only criticised but also resisted by the ASEAN.
• Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize 
or overthrew the government of a neighbouring state.
Presently, the inter-state wars are waning. e last major one was the Ethiopian-Eritrean ‘border’ war 
of 1998-2000 (Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000). e status of the armed conict is still in limbo, however.
Intra-state conicts in the Horn of Africa are caused by a number of interrelated factors, including 
the contested legitimacy of the member states; grievances over the distribution of resources; and the 
marginalization of ethno-linguistic groups (see Redie 2013). Almost all IGAD member states are 
politically fragile, with little democratic consolidation. Elections in many cases are marred by 
disputes and violence. Most of the members also face ethnic, religious and separatist conicts. In 
Sudan many of the conicts which a few years ago were grabbing international attention (viz. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan) appear to have been frozen, at least for the time being. In Ethiopia 
there is a small-scale guerrilla insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). e 
task of building the Somalian state remains elusive and the militant Somali group, Al-Shabab, not only 
commits terrorist acts on its home turf, but also undertakes cross-border raids in the region, e.g. in Kenya.
 
e gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa is demonstrated by the number of 
peace-keeping/-making operations there. e newly created Republic of South Sudan hosts the 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), whose mandate had to be 
reinforced after that country’s sudden implosion at the end of 2013. e UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed to de-escalate tensions over the territory of Abyei, now 
contested between South Sudan and post-secession Sudan. Post- secession Sudan also hosts the 
hybrid African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In Somalia there is the AU-supervised 
Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with enhanced peace-enforcement mandates. 
In contrast to the IGAD region, the ASEAN region is quite stable. One of the main testaments to 
ASEAN’s success has been its ability to prevent inter-state wars between its members. But this does 
not mean that the region is immune from sources of insecurity. It faces numerous security threats of 
both an intra-state and an inter-state nature. ere are wide regional gaps in terms of economic 
development and democratic governance. In a recent publication Rizal Sukma summed up the 
democracy/governance situation in these terms:
• Providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against 
subversive and destabilizing activities (Acharya 2001:58).
Even if observance of the non-interference norm is considered the chief reason for ASEAN’s success 
in maintaining security and stability in the region, there are critics who argue that the ASEAN 
countries have been directly and indirectly interfering in each other’s aairs (Jones 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the potential for inter-state conict, ASEAN has 
avoided war between its member states. Considering how many of the countries of the region, 
during the organization’s formative years, suered weak legitimacy and were threatened by internal 
developments like communist subversion, without the non-interference norm the region’s security 
would have been undermined (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:34). As one ASEAN foreign minister 
noted, ‘[N]on-interference in the aairs of another country was the key factor as to why no military 
conict had broken out between any two members states’ (Acharya 2001:57). 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN avoids direct involvement in the resolution of bilateral conicts 
between its members. e regional preference has been for conicting parties to resolve their 
disputes in bilateral negotiations, and if that is not possible, to allow third-party mediation or 
arbitration from within the region or elsewhere (Haacke and Williams 2009:10). 
e ASEAN way and the non-interference norm played an important role in the maintenance of 
regional peace and security during the Cold War; however, their contemporary relevance has come 
under dispute. ere is a notion that ASEAN will prove incapable of handling contemporary 
challenges, ranging from economic cooperation to environment, without further 
institutionalization and relaxation of the non-interference norm. One major response to this critique 
was the projected establishment of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with political-security, economic, and 
socio-cultural elements by 2015. 
An ASEAN Community with democratic norms and institutionalized processes of decision-making 
will be at odds with the cherished non-intervention principle and the ASEAN way. A cursory 
reading of the ways ASEAN has responded to some of the critical challenges it faced in the post-Cold 
War period nds a mixed picture. On the one hand, intense pressure from extra-regional powers has 
forced ASEAN to relax its adherence to the non-interference norm and take ‘benign’ actions against 
regimes deemed authoritarian; for example, it postponed the scheduled admission of Cambodia to 
the ASEAN after the 1997 coup. It also made public pronouncements calling for political reform in 
Myanmar (Phan 2012:119). It did not, however, make any signicant statement in response to 
military coups in ailand in 2006 and 2014. 
A comparative overview of IGAD and ASEAN experiences of conict management will sum up this 
section. First, in contrast to ASEAN, IGAD has failed to develop socio-cultural norms capable of 
handling conict quietly and informally. In fact, dierences between IGAD members, instead of 
being contained informally within the connes of the organization, more often than not are blared 
in the media. For example, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which otherwise have had very good bilateral 
relations, got into a very public row over their dierences on Somalia’s Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2001. As recently as February 2014, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who held 
the rotating chairmanship of IGAD, publicly demanded that the Ugandan President withdraw the 
troops he had sent to South Sudan to stave o the fall of Juba, its capital, to the rebels (Daily Nation 
2014). Such public rows lose face for key players in conicts, and denitely aggravate the burdens of 
conict management. As noted above, ASEAN strongly emphasizes face-saving – by following the 
dictum that when face is lost, conicts follow. e diculty of resolving the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
conict is partly due to loss of face – both parties seek to show their domestic audiences that they 
won the conict.
Secondly, IGAD is entangled in a complicated web of legal-rational norms as subsidiary to APSA, 
and seeks to formalize its conict management functions; in contrast to ASEAN, which still 
manages conict through condence-building measures, consultations, and negotiations. us, 
age-old practices of mutual intervention, use of force, and intra-regional alliances continue to 
undermine regional security in the Horn of Africa.  
REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS.
Regional autonomy is one of the aspirations underlying formation of regional organizations. As 
noted above in section 2, maintaining regional autonomy and resisting extra-regional powers are key 
functions of regional organizations. It is here, regarding autonomy and the role of extra-regional 
powers, that ASEAN and IGAD show remarkable dierences. Regional autonomy is one of the 
legal-rational norms that Acharya identied as an attribute of the ASEAN (Acharya 2001:51). In 
contrast, regional autonomy is given far less emphasis by IGAD. e initiative for establishing the 
organization in the rst place came from extra-regional players – UN agencies which believed that a 
purely functional inter-governmental organization could help coordinate actions relating to drought 
and desertication. e role of extra-regional players was even ascendant after the reinvention of the 
organization in 1996 as a broad-purpose regional organization to include security. In this respect, a 
relationship with donors was formalized by setting up the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in 1998. 
According to IGAD, the IPF has ‘three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and 
technical level’ and is chaired by the chairman of IGAD – the rotating chair of the Council of 
Ministers. e rst joint ministerial meeting of the IPF in 1998 designated Italy to serve as co-chair 
(IGAD 2010). In recent years, however, it is the Italian co-chair who has become more prominent 
in the activities of the IPF.  e IPF and other donors not only provide much of the funding for, but 
also play an active role in IGAD’s conict management activities. 
e relationship between IGAD and the IPF and other extra-regional players has three main 
features. First, almost all of IGAD’s peace and security activities are nanced by the IPF and other 
donors. It goes without saying that who controls the funding will have enormous inuence over the 
process, which undermines regional autonomy. Secondly, IGAD members use the IPF to 
consolidate their position in conict-mediation. One important example in this regard has been 
noted in relation to the Sudan peace process. By the mid-1990s, when the IGAD peace process for 
Sudan hit an impasse, Egypt and Libya sponsored other peace negotiations. IGAD members 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda used IPF to deny for the parallel peace negotiations. e position of 
IGAD in preventing the proliferation of peace negotiations in both cases, Sudan and Somalia, might 
be seen as an attempt to maintain regional autonomy, but that is far from the truth. After preventing 
parallel peace negotiations, IGAD did not promote its autonomy; instead, it conceded greater 
inuence over the South Sudan peace negotiations to the Western powers, particularly the US. 
irdly, the Western powers use their presence in the IPF to promote their own agendas (El-Aendi 2001).
In addition to the role that extra-regional powers play directly and indirectly in the security 
management of the region, more and more foreign troops are being deployed in the region because 
of the Horn of Africa’s strategic location. Prior to the onset of the so-called global war on terrorism, 
the only foreign military base in the region was the French one in Djibouti, but since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the foreign military presence has increased. Since 2003, the US has stationed the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) in Djibouti. e rather awkwardly named 
CJTF-HoA is tasked with ghting international terrorism in the region. It is presently engaged 
against the Somali Islamist movement, Al-Shabab (Rotberg 2005:111). e US has also opened 
drone and other military facilities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Public Intelligence 2013). In 
addition to US bases, the navies of several extra-regional nations have been deployed o the coast of 
Somalia to prevent piracy. While the threat of terrorism is real, the countries of the region use that 
threat to justify alliances with global powers like the US, with the ulterior intention of shoring up 
their rule at home and of securing more economic and political aid. ere is also a fear that the threat 
of terrorism may be used to stie domestic dissent and opposition within the region. 
In contrast to IGAD, ASEAN has striven to maintain regional autonomy and extend its norms by 
establishing Asia-Pacic-wide security forums like ARF. It should be noted, however, that ASEAN 
regional autonomy is controversial. In the rst place, several members of ASEAN have bilateral 
security pacts with the US and other Western powers; thus, it is not possible to present the region as 
autonomous. Indeed, during ASEAN’s formative years China and Vietnam considered it a successor 
of the failed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, and a front for Western 
imperialism (Acharya 2001:26). Nevertheless, over the years ASEAN has shown a will to maintain 
its autonomy from powerful extra-regional players (Acharya 2001:51). In doing so, the organization 
has avoided being a captive of any great power. ASEAN autonomy has also been demonstrated in the 
post-Cold War period, in its handling of Western pressures regarding Myanmar (Alden 2010). 
Despite intense pressure from the West, ASEAN proceeded with its decision in 1997 to admit that 
country into its fold. As succinctly noted by Acharya, ‘[O]ne factor that appeared to have helped 
ASEAN to overcome intra-mural dierences over Myanmar was the US decision to impose 
sanctions against Myanmar. e US action made it impossible for ASEAN to delay its admission, 
since that would imply caving in to US pressure and thereby compromise its goal of regional 
autonomy’ (Acharya 2001:113). 
e maintenance of regional autonomy persisted when ASEAN turned to the establishment of ARF 
in 1994, by expanding ASEAN norms to the wider region (Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Haacke and 
Williams 2009:5). It is the rst ‘truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacic 
region’ (Acharya 2001:173). It aims to regulate the behaviour of major powers in the region and 
beyond. ARF includes all the major powers that can aect the region, including the US, Russia, 
Japan, China and the EU. e main aim of ARF is to create a stable Asia-Pacic region in the 
post-Cold War period (Acharya 2001; Severino 2009). ASEAN not only lent its norms and working 
procedures to the ARF, but also assumed the task of chairing the group. Accordingly, the ARF 
meeting is usually held after ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and is chaired by 
AMM’s chairman. at ARF should be chaired and led by ASEAN, which in terms of power and 
international signicance is not on a par with many of ARF’s members, is no small achievement. 
ASEAN leadership of ARF may contribute to condence building and the prevention of adverse 
competition for regional dominance between the major powers (Khong and Nesadurai 2007:61). In 
addition to ARF, ASEAN also created the so-called ASEAN+3 (APT) forum which brings together 
ASEAN on one side, and China, Japan and South Korea on the other (Kurlantzick 2012). As Arase 
succinctly put it, the formation of ARF and other regional security forums showed ASEAN’s 
determination not to be passive ‘price taker’ in international security (Arase 2010:814).
In sum, while IGAD continues to be susceptible to extra-regional inuence, ASEAN has taken 
proactive steps through ARF to extend its norms to the wider Asia-Pacic region. But the current 
heating-up of tensions between China and other countries of the region, including Japan, over 
territorial disputes could undermine ARF and weaken ASEAN’s autonomy by enhancing the role of 
the US in regional security governance. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. 
ASEAN and IGAD have also a contrasting history of institutional setup. IGAD, starting from its 
inception in 1986, was conceived as a formal organization with clearly dened decision-making 
organs and a standing Secretariat. e institutions of ASEAN, however, developed incrementally. In 
addition, the emphasis in ASEAN has been on institutional minimalism and informality. 
e 1996 revision gave IGAD the following key organs. e Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) is the highest decision-making body. It sets the objectives, guidelines and 
programmes of the organization, meeting once a year. e Chairman is elected from the member 
states in rotation (IGAD 2001). Next to AHSG is the Council of Ministers (CoM). It comprises the 
foreign ministers and one other focal minister as designated by member states. Meeting twice a year, 
CoM is responsible for the formulation of policy and for providing guidance to the Secretariat. e 
third organ is the Ambassadors’ Committee (AC), which meets as often as necessary and provides 
regular support and guidance to the Secretariat (IGAD 1996). 
e IGAD Secretariat, which reports to the Council of Ministers is based in Djibouti and is headed 
by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the AHSG for a four-year term. It helps prepare 
policies and with the follow-up of implementing the decisions of the organization. e Secretariat 
has three major units specializing in: economic cooperation and social development; agriculture and 
environment; and peace and security. In addition, the Conict Early Warning Network and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Security Sector Program (SSP), established in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, are attached as separate units to the Secretariat. Both programs are meant to 
strengthen IGAD’s security management capacity. CEWARN aims to prevent conict by providing 
timely early warning reports (‘alerts’) to governments of the region, while SSP aims to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement ocials of the region to prevent terrorist crimes, money laundering, and 
human tracking (IGAD no date). 
CEWARN is another example of IGAD’s attempt to create formalized structures of conict 
management. e idea is to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible ocials 
about the possibility of conict breaking out (IGAD no date). So far, implementation of this 
programme has been limited to cross-border, ‘non-political’ resource conicts that have emerged 
between pastoral communities. e proposal to expand the framework to cover intra- and inter-state 
conicts and to provide structures for member states to respond to signs of conict has been 
indenitely shelved.
As noted above, ASEAN’s institutional structures developed incrementally. It is important to 
emphasize that ASEAN’s institutional setup is characterized by institutional minimalism and 
informality. e meeting in 1967 that led to the establishment of ASEAN was a low-key aair and 
was not attended by heads of states or governments, but only foreign ministers. e rst-ever 
summit of ASEAN was held in 1976 in Bali, Indonesia. Before the Bali Concord, the highest 
decision-making organ of the ASEAN had been AMM (Sukma 2014:5). After the Bali summit, the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments became the highest decision-making organ. e Bali 
Concord also established a Secretariat, but the Secretary General was called Secretary General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat in order to limit his/her function to the administrative aairs of the organization.  
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e fourth ASEAN summit meeting held in Singapore in 1992 decided to hold a summit every 
three years with informal meetings in between (Sukma 2014:7). Starting from 2001, the summit 
became an annual event; however, since 2009 it has been made biannual. e Singapore summit also 
reformed the Secretariat: the head is now called Secretary General of ASEAN (Sukma 2014).
Partly due to the diculty ASEAN faces in the handling non-belligerent cross-border security 
challenges in the post-Cold War period, there has been an eort at institutional reinvention (Sukma 
2014: 10). e 2003 summit yielded the vision of an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020 (later brought 
forward to 2015), to be based upon three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), later renamed ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Collins 2007:203). 
e ASEAN Charter of 2007 created a more hierarchical organizational setup. At the top was the 
Summit, which is the highest policymaking organ. Next to the Summit is the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council (AMM). ree new councils were established to complement AMM: the ASEAN Political 
and Security Council, the ASEAN Economic Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. 
Below these Councils are the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General (Sukma 2014:11). e 
Charter also established many other new institutions, such as the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR), the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
and ASEAN National Secretariats (Sukma 2014). 
REGIONAL HEGEMONS.
e role that regional hegemons play in the maintenance of peace and security has emerged as an 
important topic in the post-Cold War period, in tandem with the growing enthusiasm for the 
security functions of regional organizations (see Francis 2006; Kacowicz 1998). Fascination with this 
idea comes from the neo-Realist theory of hegemonic stability, which purports to explain the 
economic and political international order that was established after World War II under US 
hegemony (Keohane 1999). 
A regional hegemon, according to Kacowicz, is a state with sucient material economic and military 
power and the political will to dominate a regional system (Kacowicz 1998). In his book Zones of 
Peace Kacowicz argued that regional hegemons like Nigeria in West Africa or Brazil in South 
America play important roles in maintaining regional peace and security (Kacowicz 1998:193). 
Likewise, Francis notes that if regional organizations in Africa are to play an important role in 
security governance, there is a need for ‘a regional hegemon, or a pivotal state, to take the lead in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security’ (Francis 2006:242). Having said this, however, he noted 
that, even though two countries in Africa could play this pivotal role – Nigeria and South Africa – 
it is Nigeria which has shown interest in taking the lead in West Africa, whereas South Africa has 
been reluctant to take up the mantle of  hegemonic leadership in southern Africa (Francis 2006: 242). 
Coming to the Horn of Africa, in this region no country appears to have the capacity to take up the 
hegemonic role singularly. As a result, there is implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, all of which of course have strengths in dierent areas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has been 
playing a prominent role in IGAD in terms of ocial leadership. Since the 12th Ordinary Session 
of the IGAD AHSG, which was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, Ethiopia has been holding the 
rotating chairmanship. e same goes for the Council of Ministers.6 e holding of the rotating 
chairmanship by Ethiopia may have been precipitated by the international isolation of the president 
of Sudan as a result of his indictment by the International Criminal Court and the continued 
instability in Somalia and South Sudan. ese problems implicitly make the three countries 
ineligible to take the mantle of leadership for the time being. But lack of clarity by IGAD about the 
problem and the indenite continuation of the present arrangement may undermine the credibility 
of the organization.
In the ASEAN region, the notion of a regional hegemon has been uid (Haacke and Williams 
2009:7-8). During the formative years of the organization, the most important regional power was 
Indonesia. Indeed, some consider the formation of the ASEAN in 1967 as a quid pro quo in which 
it got accepted as primus inter pares by the other members, in exchange for which Indonesia agreed 
to eschew destabilization policies (Anwar 1994:226-227). Certainly ASEAN itself was not 
established until after Indonesia ended its policy of Konfrontasi. e main interest of Indonesia in 
promoting regionalism was to normalize relations with its wary neighbours; limit the dependence of 
the region on extra-regional powers for security; and also to secure its own internal stability (Neyer 
2012:240). 
Indonesia’s position in the region was gravely undermined in 1997 by nancial and political crises. 
While it was consumed by its own internal woes at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, 
ailand and Singapore came forward and took a more prominent role in ASEAN (Kurlantzick 
2012:10-11). ere appears to be ‘no open struggle for regional hegemony’ at present (Haacke and 
Williams 2009:7); however, given that Indonesia’s nascent democracy is being consolidated and its 
economy growing, there is a feeling that it may once again take a leading role (Kurlantzick 2012). 
ere are observers who think that an increasingly condent Indonesia should take that role in this 
juncture where there are major shifts in regional power structures because of the rise of China 
(Nelson 2013). To buttress his point, Nelson notes that Indonesia’s traditional policy of 
non-alignment and its desire to reduce the inuence of major powers, which is reected in its 
current foreign policy orientation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ that promotes cooperative relations with 
almost all the major powers, should strengthen its position as regional leader (Nelson 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS AND COMPARATIVE LESSONS.
Both IGAD and ASEAN currently face challenges that will aect their future, but of dierent kinds. 
e challenges of IGAD are bound up with foundational problems. It is still relatively young, and 
the security environment in which it operates today is not much dierent from the one it was born 
into. IGAD members and other regional states are involved in complicated security endeavours 
ranging from mediation (South Sudan) and peace enforcement (Somalia) to institution building for 
regional security governance. In contrast, ASEAN has contributed much to regional security already, 
and is today in a process of re-inventing itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. In these 
concluding paragraphs we will examine the challenges and prospects that the two organizations face.
IGAD major challenges include, rst, the inability or unwillingness of member states to shed 
practices like the use of force and mutual intervention, which continue to gravely undermine 
IGAD’s aspirations to emerge as an eective regional institution of security governance. In so far as 
these practices persist in one form or another, it is pointless to talk about rule-based regional security 
governance. IGAD has also failed to develop a shared identity or any socio-culturally grounded 
norms that could help maintain regional security. On the other hand, there is no lack of transplanted 
international liberal norms. One could argue that IGAD may be considered a subsidiary of APSA, 
therefore many of the liberal and democratic norms that have been adopted by the continental 
organization (AU) are applicable as well to IGAD members and other countries of the region. But 
in reality, both the AU and IGAD have instituted no eective mechanisms to enforce these norms; 
neither have member states shown any interest in living by the several treaties to which they have 
acceded over the years. 
Secondly, the ongoing hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have a tendency to spill over to 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Somalia) undermining IGAD’s ability to provide regional security. 
irdly, there is a serious problem of ownership of IGAD’s security activities, much of the funding 
for which has come from Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Its heavy reliance on external 
funding undermines IGAD’s ability to develop its own identity and shared regional norms. 
Fourthly, the global ‘war on terrorism’ and the spread of terrorism in the region threaten the region’s 
security and the role IGAD plays in security governance. International terrorism has revived the 
region’s geopolitical signicance. Many countries in the region have aligned with the Western powers 
not simply to ght terrorism but also to secure political, economic and military aid. ere is a fear 
in some parts of the region that the threat of terrorism is being used to stie domestic dissent. On 
the other hand, the inability to provide a negotiated settlement to protracted conicts paves the way 
for terrorist movements like Al-Shabab in Somalia, which only compound the problem. Once a 
conict is framed in the discourse of terrorism, a negotiated peace will be dicult, if not impossible.
Finally, in light of these challenges, what are IGAD’s prospects in the security governance of the 
sub-region? And what lessons can it learn from ASEAN’s experience? IGAD will surely continue its 
attempts at conict management in the teeth of the profound challenges it faces. As the only 
organization with a mandate to pursue regional security, IGAD’s member states will continue to use 
the organization for security governance. e other factor buttressing the role of IGAD is the 
support that it enjoys from international actors like the Western powers and even China, who have 
a lot at stake in the security of the region. But this by itself will not make IGAD an eective security 
organization. 
In so far as the region’s countries do not move away from the destructive practices of mutual 
intervention, the use of force and intra-regional alliance formation, IGAD would remain a platform 
strategically exploited by regional and extra-regional powers, and can never develop its own shared 
identity. e main lesson IGAD can learn from the experience of ASEAN is the necessity of 
developing such an identity along with mutually accepted norms of security governance. e 
ASEAN norms that helped that organization emerge as an eective security organization in the past 
– non-intervention, non-interference and socio-cultural norms such as consultation, face-saving, 
consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy – yield important lessons for security governance by 
IGAD. We are not advocating the transplantation of alien norms. e principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention derive from international law and may be found in the AU Constitutive Act and 
in the IGAD agreement. Ocially, all member states of IGAD have committed themselves to these 
norms; what is lacking is the practice. 
May one question the wisdom of the non-intervention principle at a time when ASEAN itself is 
struggling to transcend rigid notions of it? e answer to this question is simple. e Horn of Africa 
has become a byword for interventions that have gone wrong both in intent and in practice. Before 
the region’s countries can really use IGAD’s facilities to manage intra-state and inter-state conicts, 
they need a period of condence-building which can only be secured by committing themselves not 
to intervene in each other’s aairs. e socio-cultural norms in ASEAN’s development especially 
quiet diplomacy; face-saving and consultation are not that alien to African cultures. 
Coming to ASEAN, it also faces numerous challenges which inuence its prospects. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN was being credited with providing regional security, and its 
performance rated highly in comparison with other regional organizations in the ird World 
(Kurlantzick 2012). But since the end of the 1990s, ASEAN has begun to face multifaceted 
challenges. In short, these challenges may be seen from the perspectives of economics, e.g. nancial 
crisis; governance and politics, e.g. coups and authoritarian rule; and environment, e.g. pollution 
(Haacke 2003; Kurlantzick 2012).
In addition to these challenges, the rise of China has begun to shift the regional structure of power, 
which has become more evident since the onset of the new millennium. A resurgent China, which 
has territorial disputes with several ASEAN member states, presents a security challenge to the 
region (Nelson 2013). As it becomes ever more assertive, some countries of the region appear to be 
looking to the US to safeguard regional security. 
e geopolitical tension within the wider Asia-Pacic region between China on the one hand, and 
Japan and the USA on the other, could have serious repercussions for the region. Unless ASEAN can 
maintain what Acharya calls ‘centrality’ in the security governance structures of the wider 
Asia-Pacic region (2013:20), its relevance could be brought into question in the near future. 
Geopolitical tensions could also lead to the damping of pressures for democratic reforms from 
extra-regional powers like the US and the EU and even from domestic actors of the region. 
Moreover, as the various member states have diering economic and political ties with China, its 
territorial claims may be divisive within ASEAN (Nelson 2013).
Aside from geopolitical tensions, ASEAN has been engaged in institutional innovation and a 
reluctant importation of liberal and democratic norms in order to address the challenges it has been 
facing since the 1997 nancial crisis. As many scholars have noted, these challenges have cast doubt 
on the continuing relevance of ASEAN norms, particularly non-intervention, informality and 
institutional minimalism (Acharya 2001; Collins 2007; Kurlantzick 2012). Proposals like 
‘constructive intervention’ and ‘exible engagement’ have been oated within the ASEAN 
leadership, but the member states have declined to support them as subversive of the 
non-intervention principle – which is seen as a sure way of debilitating the organization and inviting 
conict in the region (see Acharya 2001:154). 
Lately, ASEAN has begun the process of modernization noted above (Khong and Nesadurai 
2007:44), guided by the 2003 Summit (Bali Concord II), which mandated the formation of an 
ASEAN Community. e decision to transform ASEAN, at least in theory, into a three pillar 
community is a major break from the organization’s traditional norms. e realization of the 
Community will bring about a more formalized, rule-based integration (Sukma 2014). is 
innovation is derivative of the theory and practice of European regionalism, and modelled on the 
European experience (Jetschke 2013). 
e ASEAN Community’s instruments contain concepts which were previously taboo in the region. 
For instance, the blueprint of the APSC sets the Community’s aspiration as being to –  
e discourse of human rights has also nally crept into ASEAN publicity. It committed itself for 
the rst time in 1993 to the establishment of a regional mechanism for advancing human rights. e 
2007 ASEAN Charter mandates the establishment of a regional human rights body, which was 
implemented by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009 
(Collins 2013:6). 
But there are immense diculties standing in the way of realizing the stated commitments to an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Most importantly, unlike European regionalism, there is no 
willingness on the part of the member states to establish institutions for enforcing the various 
benchmarks in the formation of the political-security and economic pillars of the Community. Even 
compliance regarding the formation of the ASEAN single market is by and large left up to the 
member states. As Dosch succinctly put it:
If the ASEAN is going to realize its vision of building a community, the member states need to 
comply with their commitments. But observers on the ground see little reason for optimism 
regarding compliance. What Haacke once said about ASEAN regionalism remains valid: the 
member states are not yet ready to let go of long-standing norms of the organization like sovereignty 
and non-interference (2003:60-61). A sober assessment of the situation reveals that there is logic to 
the member states’ reluctance to comply. Take the situation of governance for instance: many of the 
countries of the region are not yet democratic. e wide gap in socio-economic development 
between the member states also frustrates the goal of establishing a single market. Taking all of these 
considerations into account, the aspiration to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015 appears to 
be farfetched. 
In a rather paradoxical manner, the ASEAN and IGAD (and the AU) exhibit some of the same 
problems of compliance. Both regions have been importing liberal norms of democracy and human 
rights, but member states of both organizations have no appetite for implementing these norms. If 
this trend continues, the two organizations will look more and more alike. It is important to note 
here that ASEAN could take lessons from the experience of African regionalism concerning the 
futility of reluctant (or even wholehearted) importation of liberal norms when the conditions for 
compliance are lacking. A destabilizing temptation exists for ASEAN to soften its traditional norms 
without developing a culture of domestic and regional compliance with liberal norms of democracy 
and human rights along with an institutionalized mechanism for conict resolution. 
Finally, the quest for rule-based, institutionalized regionalism with an aspect of supranational 
authority has been informed by the experience of European integration (Neyer 2012:170). e 
inuence of European regionalism is such that it was taken as the model to emulate. But the 
conditions that supported European regionalism are simply not present in many regions of the 
world, including Southeast Asia, where any move toward integration will be frustrated by problems 
of compliance. A long-time observer of the region says that if ASEAN is going to be relevant in the 
coming decades, the member states need to comply with ‘a multitude of old and new declarations, 
agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols, plans of action, blueprints, [and] concords’ (Acharya 
2013:20). Yet the diering political and economic conditions that prevail across the countries of the 
region will render it dicult, if not impossible, to exact the compliance of the member states with 
all these agreements. is probably warrants a rethink of the manner in which ASEAN regionalism 
(or more generally ird World regionalism) ought to develop, both in the realms of scholarship and 
of policy-making.
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